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INTRODUCTION 
Over the span of thirty years, eleven women accused Frank of 
rape.1  Frank’s first relevant convictions occurred in 1970.2  That year, 
Frank broke into four homes over a four-month period.3  The home 
invasions were “virtually identical;”4 Frank would target unsuspecting 
women, follow each one to her apartment, force his way inside her 
home and threaten to harm or kill her.5  He forced the women to 
undress and proceeded to rape and to rob each of them.6  Frank was 
arrested on sexual assault charges 7  and was indicted for sexual 
                                                                                                                          
 1. See State v. Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d 483, 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) 
(“Respondent is a 67-year-old sex offender who was convicted of raping and 
sodomizing four women in their homes, and accused of raping seven more women, 
over 30 years ago.”). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
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offenses in one of the four home invasions.8  He was convicted of 
burglary in the second and third degrees, robbery in the first, second, 
and third degrees, and grand larceny.9  Although he was sentenced to 
a maximum of twenty-five years, he only served seven.10 
Upon his release in 1977, Frank committed another six home 
invasions and rapes within a four-month period.11  He committed the 
first invasion one month after he was discharged.12  The invasions 
followed the same pattern Frank presented prior to his 
incarceration.13  This time, when Frank was caught, he was convicted 
of three of the rapes and convicted of the nonsexual offenses he 
committed against each woman.14 
Frank then spent thirty-three years in prison.15  In 2010, Frank was 
up for parole once again. 16   The State of New York began a 
proceeding to civilly commit Frank under New York Mental Hygiene 
Law Article 10 (“Article 10”).17  Under this law, New York State has 
                                                                                                                          
 8. These charges were dismissed before trial. See id. 
 9. See id.  There is no public record as to why Frank was only convicted of 
burglary, robbery and grand larceny or why the indicted sexual charges were 
dismissed.  However, ninety-four percent of state convictions result from plea-
bargaining. Stephanie Stern, Note, Regulating the New Gold Standard of Criminal 
Justice:  Confronting the Lack of Record-Keeping in the American Criminal Justice 
System, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 245, 245 (2015).  Thus, it is possible that Frank’s 
conviction was the result of plea-bargaining. 
 10. Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 485  (“He received a maximum prison sentence of 25 
years.  He was released on parole in May 1977.”).  There is no public record as to why 
Frank was let out before serving his maximum sentence.  A report published by the 
U.S. Department of Justice in 1999 stated that “[t]he amount of time offenders serve 
in prison is almost always shorter than the time they are sentenced by the court.” 
PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TRUTH IN 
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS (Jan. 1999), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EB8T-S3G3]. 
 11. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 485-86. 
 12. See id. at 485. 
 13. See id. at 486 (“As before, he followed the women to their apartments, where 
he raped and sodomized them.  He left the women tied up or in a closet while he 
burglarized their homes, fleeing with minor items.”). 
 14. See id.  Frank was sentenced to twelve and a half to twenty-five years’ 
imprisonment for these crimes, but his maximum sentence became twenty-five years 
to forty-six years to reflect the time not served in his prior convictions. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Frank was sixty-two years old at the time.  See id. 
 17. See id.; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(a) (McKinney 2011) (“If the 
case review team finds that a respondent is a sex offender requiring civil 
management, then the attorney general may file a sex offender civil management 
petition.”). 
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the power to civilly commit detained sex offenders 18  who are 
determined at trial to suffer from a mental abnormality that 
predisposes the offender to commit another sex offense.19  At Frank’s 
trial, two experts concluded that he suffered from paraphilia not 
otherwise specified (“paraphilia NOS”)20 based on urges related to 
non-consenting partners, and antisocial personality disorder 
(“ASPD”).21  Both experts concluded that the diagnosis of paraphilia 
NOS predisposed Frank to commit sexual offenses and caused him 
serious difficulty in controlling his sexual impulses.22  They also 
opined that his diagnosis of ASPD hindered his volitional control, 
making him predisposed to committing sexual assaults if released 
again. 23   At trial, a jury found Frank suffered from a mental 
abnormality and qualified for civil commitment.24  The Court placed 
                                                                                                                          
 18. A “detained sex offender” is defined under Article 10 as a “person who is in 
the care, custody, control or supervision of an agency with jurisdiction, with respect 
to a sex offense or designated felony . . . .” N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(g). 
 19. Id. § 10.07(f) (“If the court finds by a clear and convincing evidence that the 
respondent has a mental abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to 
commit sex offenses . . . the respondent shall be committed to a secure treatment 
facility for care, treatment and control . . . .”).  This type of law, typically referred to 
as Sexually Violent Predator laws, has been adopted in twenty states, the District of 
Columbia and by the federal government. See Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent 
Predators, ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-sexually-violent-predators 
[https://perma.cc/3AXL-BRWQ]; see also infra Section 1.C. 
 20. A paraphilia diagnosis is given when a person has “recurrent, intense sexually 
arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman 
objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one’s partner, or 3) children or 
other nonconsenting persons that occur over a period of at least 6 months . . . .” AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-
IV-TR 566 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].  “Paraphilia NOS” is used as a 
category for “coding Paraphilias that do not meet the criteria for any of the specific 
categories.” Id. at 576.  Although the DSM-5 has split this diagnosis into two 
categories, Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder and Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder, 
they are similarly used as diagnoses for persons that do not meet a specific Paraphilic 
disorder. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 5, 705 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]; see also Michael B. First, 
DSM-5 and Paraphilic Disorders, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 191, 198 (2014). 
 21. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 486.  A person suffers from antisocial personality 
disorder when he or she presents “a pervasive patter of disregard for, and violation 
of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues 
into adulthood.” DSM-5, supra note 20, at 659. 
 22. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 487. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. at 488. 
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Frank P. under strict intensive supervision and treatment (“SIST”),25 
a form of civil commitment under Article 10.26 
Nevertheless, the First Department of the New York Appellate 
Division reversed the trial court’s holding.  It instead held that 
Frank’s condition was insufficient for civil commitment.27  The First 
Department relied on the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in 
State v. Donald DD.28  Donald DD. held that a diagnosis of ASPD 
alone is insufficient to establish the requirement of a mental 
abnormality under Article 10 29  because the diagnosis does not 
distinguish the repeat sex offender from the typical recidivist.30  The 
First Department dismissed the petition to civilly confine Frank 
because his diagnosis of ASPD was insufficient to show he had 
difficulty in controlling his behavior and therefore he was not 
distinguished from the typical criminal recidivist.31  Frank was no 
longer subject to SIST conditions under Article 10.32 
                                                                                                                          
 25. See id. (“Supreme Court was persuaded by respondent’s lack of sexually 
deviant behavior while incarcerated; his lack of prison disciplinary violations during 
the last six years of his sentence; his ‘constructive work in prison’ to complete his 
education and assist other inmates; his ‘realistic goals’ upon release; and the 
continued involvement of his family and relatives in his life, to conclude that 
respondent could live at liberty without reoffending if strictly supervised.”). 
 26. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(f) (McKinney 2011) (“If the court does not 
find that the respondent is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, then the 
court shall make a finding of disposition that the respondent is a sex offender 
requiring strict and intensive supervision . . . .”). 
 27. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 492. 
 28. See id. at 485 (“This proceeding, however, preceded the recent 
pronouncement by the Court of Appeals in Matter of State of New York v. Donald 
DD. . . . [where] the Court of Appeals limited the evidence that can be used to civilly 
commit a convicted sex offender . . . .”); State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239 (N.Y. 
2014). 
 29. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 490-91. 
 30. See id. at 491 (“[W]hen the ASPD diagnosis is not accompanied by a 
diagnosis of any other condition, disease or disorder alleged to constitute a mental 
abnormality [it] simply does not distinguish the sex offender whose mental 
abnormality subjects him to civil commitment from the typical recidivist convicted in 
an ordinary criminal case.”) (quoting Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 250). 
 31. See id. at 493 (“[G]iven Donald DD., we find that the inferences that logically 
flow from such evidence are insufficient to support a determination, under the clear 
and convincing evidence standard, that respondent will have serious difficulty in 
controlling his behavior . . . .”). 
 32. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(e) (McKinney 2011) (“If . . . the 
court . . . determines that the attorney general has not sustained his or her burden of 
establishing that the respondent is a detained sex offender who suffers from a mental 
abnormality, the court shall dismiss the petition and the respondent shall be released 
. . . .”). 
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New York courts have consistently interpreted Donald DD. as 
holding that a sole diagnosis of ASPD is insufficient to civilly confine 
a sex offender.33  To be sure, some courts in New York have instead 
stated that, under certain conditions, ASPD may be sufficient to 
civilly confine a sex offender.34  This Note argues that ASPD alone 
should be a condition sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender.  This 
is demonstrated when evaluating the purpose of Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws,35 the manner in which other states have permitted 
ASPD to be a sufficient diagnosis in Sexually Violent Predator 
proceedings,36 and why civil commitment hearings should not proceed 
under bright-line rules, but instead under an individualized 
approach.37 
Part I describes the development of the civil commitment of sex 
offenders through Sexually Violent Predator Laws 38  and the 
constitutionality of these laws under Kansas v. Hendricks39  and 
Kansas v. Crane.40  Part I then explains the New York Court of 
Appeals’ decision in State v. Donald DD., which held that ASPD was 
                                                                                                                          
 33. See State v. Richard TT., 14 N.Y.S.3d 824, 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (“The 
Court of Appeals has determined that a diagnosis of ASPD, without more, does not 
meet that requirement, as it ‘establishes only a general tendency toward criminality, 
and has no necessary relationship to a difficulty in controlling one’s sexual 
behavior.’”); State v. Raymundo V., 8 N.Y.S.3d 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (holding a 
diagnosis of ASPD and alcohol dependence insufficient for civil commitment); State 
v. Maurice G., 4 N.Y.S.3d 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (holding a diagnosis of ASPD and 
psychopathy was not sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender because psychopathy, 
like ASPD, is not a sexual disorder and does not in itself predispose one to commit a 
sex offense). 
 34. See State v. Jerome A., No. 30261-2014, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3243, at *17-
18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (“This Court respectfully disagrees with the reasoning 
process which the Donald DD. majority used to determine that ASPD alone cannot 
serve as the predicate for a Mental Abnormality, although this Court believes there 
are other valid arguments which might be advanced to support the same conclusion.  
Simply because most prison inmates can be diagnosed with ASPD does not mean 
most prison inmates could also be subject to Article 10 because of such a diagnosis.”) 
(emphasis added); see also State v. Glenn T., 6 N.Y.S.3d 462, 465 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2015) (“[B]ased upon the determination of Donald DD., the Court must review 
evidence of each particular case and those particular circumstances to make a finding 
of whether or not to vacate the order based on the lack of supporting evidence to 
provide for a ‘mental abnormality.’”) (emphasis added). 
 35. See infra Section I.C. 
 36. See infra Sections II.A-B. 
 37. See infra Part III. 
 38. These laws “provide a legal mechanism for the confinement of a limited 
number of adult sexual offenders in a secure treatment facility after incarceration 
when a court determines they are likely to engage in future acts of sexual violence.” 
See ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, supra note 19, at 83. 
 39. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 40. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
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not a sufficient diagnosis on its own to civilly confine a sex offender 
under New York’s law because of the constitutional considerations in 
Kansas v. Crane.41  Part II presents a comparison of how other states 
have used the diagnosis of ASPD and the holding in Kansas v. Crane 
in the context of evaluating if the offender has a record to distinguish 
him42 from the typical recidivist.43   
Finally, Part III argues that a diagnosis of ASPD on its own should 
be sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender under New York’s 
Sexually Violent Predator Law.44  Part III argues that the totality of 
the circumstances—an individualized approach—is better than a 
bright-line rule where the law and psychology interact.  This is 
conveyed by evaluating the constitutional standard set out in Kansas 
v. Crane, which leaves open the possibility that ASPD could be a 
condition sufficient for civil commitment, by looking at subsequent 
case law in New York that disagrees with the reasoning in Donald 
DD., and by evaluating the purpose of civil commitment laws.  Part 
III also demonstrates how the totality of the circumstances approach 
is already used when balancing the considerations of constitutional 
rights of a citizen and the police power of the state in the Fourth 
Amendment context and thus should also be used in this case.45 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND HOW IT RELATES TO PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DIAGNOSES IN NEW YORK 
Sex Offender Civil Commitment Laws have been evolving since 
their inception.  Part I explains the development of civil commitment 
in the United States.  It begins with the early forms of civil 
commitment and then describes the creation of the modern civil 
commitment law, the Sexually Violent Predator Law, and its 
constitutionality.  Part I then specifies New York’s version of the civil 
commitment law, Mental Hygiene Law Article 10, and examines the 
                                                                                                                          
 41. See infra Section I.C.2. 
 42. This Note will use the male pronoun to refer to sex offenders as most known 
sex offenders are men. See Richard Tewksbury, Experiences and Attitudes of 
Registered Female Sex Offenders, 68 FED. PROB. 30, 30 (2004) (“Studies of female 
sex offenders are relatively rare, at least in part because most known sex offenders 
are male.”). 
 43. See infra Section II.B. 
 44. While most states refer to their respective laws as “Sexually Violent Predator 
Laws,” New York’s law was enacted as the “Sex Offender Management and 
Treatment Act of 2007” and is commonly called Mental Hygiene Law Article 10.  
This Note will primarily use “Mental Hygiene Law Article 10” and “Sexually Violent 
Predator Law” for clarity. 
 45. See infra Part III. 
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New York Court of Appeals' interpretation of this law in light of the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of civil commitment 
laws. 
Section I.A portrays a brief history of civil commitment in the 
United States of persons with mental illness who were deemed to be a 
danger to society.  Section I.B describes the earliest form of civil 
commitment laws for sex offenders, Sexual Psychopath Laws.  Section 
I.C portrays the development of modern civil commitment laws for 
sex offenders, the Sexually Violent Predator Laws.  It also explains 
the leading United States Supreme Court cases, Kansas v. 
Hendricks46 and Kansas v. Crane,47 which upheld the constitutionality 
of these laws.  Section I.C.1 then describes New York’s Sexually 
Violent Predator Law, Mental Hygiene Law Article 10.48  Section 
I.C.2 finally illuminates how the New York Court of Appeals 
interprets the constitutionality of Article 10 within the context of 
Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane in State v. Donald DD.49 
A. History of Civil Commitment in the United States 
The idea of the civil commitment of persons with mental illness50 
dates back to colonial times.51  Initially, there were no hospitals for 
the mentally ill.52  It was primarily expected that family would take 
care of those who could not conform to societal norms. 53  
Nevertheless, the public feared that the burden would soon shift to 
them to support those without familial help.54  The public also feared 
those persons with mental illness who were deemed to pose a danger 
                                                                                                                          
 46. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 47. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 48. See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2011). 
 49. See generally State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239 (N.Y. 2014). 
 50. The National Alliance on Mental Illness defines a mental illness as a 
“condition that affects a person’s thinking, feeling or mood.  Such conditions may 
affect someone’s ability to relate to others and function each day.  Each person will 
have different experiences, even people with the same diagnosis.” Mental Health 
Conditions, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/Learn-
More/Mental-Health-Conditions [https://perma.cc/4AJ9-NTEU]. 
 51. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Mental Health Law:  Its History and Its Future, 
20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 599 (1996). 
 52. See Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment–The 
American Experience, 43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY RELAT. SCI. 209, 210 (2006); see also 
EDWARD B. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 3 (Michael Brown et al. eds., 
1984). 
 53. See Joseph Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 58 AM. BAR 
ASSOC. J. 1059 (1972). 
 54. See BEIS, supra note 52, at 3 (“Townspeople resented the itinerant poor, 
fearing they would have to support them.”). 
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to society.55  This led to the incarceration of those with mental health 
issues.56  The “treatment” of these individuals consisted of restraint, 
sedation with medications, or experimental treatments.57 
This “treatment” soon proved ineffective in terms of improving 
patients’ ability to live in society.58  Eventually, poor conditions, the 
immense overcrowding of jails, and the concern for treatment over 
restraint led to the development of psychiatric hospitals.59  The first 
psychiatric admission to a facility was in Pennsylvania in 1752.60  
Throughout the next century, other states followed.61   As more 
mental hospitals were built, the number of persons committed to 
these facilities increased.62 
In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, a shift in approach 
in the treatment of the mentally ill occurred. 63   There was a 
movement to develop state-supported mental hospitals with an 
emphasis on “moral treatment”64 or “treatment for mental illness 
based on belief that mental illness was caused by moral decay.”65  For 
example, in 1845, a Massachusetts court held that Josiah Oakes’ 
commitment was justified because he had hallucinations and he was 
engaged to a “young woman of blemished character shortly after the 
death of his wife.” 66   The Court reasoned that “[t]he question 
must . . . arise in each particular case, whether a patient’s own safety, 
or that of others requires that he should be restrained for a certain 
time and whether restraint is necessary for his restoration or will be 
conducive thereto.”67  The “moral treatment” approach rooted its 
justification on the principle of rehabilitation.  Interestingly, persons 
                                                                                                                          
 55. See Appelbaum, supra note 51. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 
PSYCHIATRY 30, 31 (2010); see also BEIS, supra note 52 (“If mentally disabled persons 
were dangerous the sheriff or constable detained and forcibly restrained them . . . . 
Communities took action to restrain the violent, not treat them.”). 
 58. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32. 
 59. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 209-10. 
 60. See id. at 210. 
 61. See BEIS, supra note 52, at 4 (explaining that Virginia opened its first hospital 
for the mentally ill in 1773, New York authorized the commitment of the mentally 
unstable in 1788, and Kentucky established the Eastern Lunatic Asylum in 1824). 
 62. See id.  
 63. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210. 
 64. Id. 
 65. JAMES MCKENZIE ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNITY HEALTH 371 
(7th ed. 2011). 
 66. BEIS, supra note 52, at 4-5. 
 67. Id. at 4 (quoting Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123, 125 (Mass. 1845)). 
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with mental illness could be restrained whether or not they posed a 
danger to society.68 
When states shifted their thinking from restraint to treatment, early 
forms of civil commitment laws were enacted by several states.69  This 
was the first time that the care of the individual shaped state policy.70  
The laws that were enacted started defining standards for involuntary 
treatment.71  States are granted the power to create laws to civilly 
confine individuals under two legal principles.72  The first, parens 
patriae, or “father of the country,”73 allows the government to act as a 
parent on behalf of individuals who cannot take care of themselves.74  
In doing so, the government uses its own judgment to make decisions 
for those who lack the capacity to make decisions themselves.75  The 
other principle, the state’s police power, requires the government to 
protect the general welfare of society.76  This power thus grants 
authority to the government to construct measures that will protect 
society from individuals that may pose a danger to its security.77 
Initially, family members and doctors decided whom to admit to 
the state psychiatric institutions.78  The bar to admit a person was low; 
there were no established procedural barriers79 and there was very 
little judicial intervention.80  This made it relatively easy to civilly 
commit persons “deemed” to have mental illnesses.  For example, in 
                                                                                                                          
 68. See id. 
 69. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31. 
 73. Samuel Jan Brackel, Involuntary Institutionalization, in THE MENTALLY 
DISABLED AND THE LAW 24 (Frank T. Lindman & Donald M. McIntyre eds., 3d ed. 
1985). 
 74. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31. 
 75. See Brackel, supra note 73, at 24 (“The individual’s decisional incompetency 
is thus the ‘threshold requirement’ for the state to invoke its parens patriae 
authority . . . .”). 
 76. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31. 
 77. See Brackel, supra note 73, at 24 (“Rather than protect individuals from 
themselves or others, the police power tends to be invoked on behalf of society or 
societal interests against the individual.”). 
 78. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210. 
 79. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32 (“The standards of the day required only 
that the presence of mental illness and a recommendation for treatment be 
established to prove that admission of a person to a psychiatric hospital against his or 
her will was necessary.”). 
 80. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210 (“Judicial involvement was 
typically limited to endorsing medical opinions of need for treatment, and may have 
also served cost control and resource allocation.”). 
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1860, Elizabeth Packard’s husband civilly committed her for exploring 
religions outside of the Presbyterian faith.81  When she was released 
three years later, she lost custody of her children and ownership of 
her property.82  The public saw involuntary commitments such as 
Elizabeth Packard’s as unjust because the commitment by her 
husband did not seem to fit the rehabilitative and protective purposes 
of civil commitment.83 
In the twentieth century, states changed these laws by placing more 
regulations and restrictions on civilly committing persons with mental 
illnesses. 84   For the next 100 years, reformers advocated for 
procedural safeguards such as jury trials or judicial hearings. 85  
Physicians were required to examine individuals and testify as to 
whether or not they should be involuntarily committed to a 
psychiatric institution.86  There was a focus on protecting the “right to 
liberty of the person being considered for commitment.”87  While this 
appeared to be a step in the right direction, problems still ensued:  
persons being considered for commitment were often detained in jail 
until their trial was finished and physicians often debated which 
standard should be sufficient for civil commitment.88 
The next shift in civil commitment reform occurred in the mid-
twentieth century. 89   Questions regarding the legitimacy of the 
psychiatric diagnoses90 and the development of new medications91 led 
                                                                                                                          
 81. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id.; see also Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210 
(“Hospitalizations were involuntary and treatment was coerced, since it was 
presumed that all mentally ill patients had compromised reason to the extent that 
they were unable to request (or refuse) care on their own behalf.”). 
 84. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32 (“These legal protections included 
potential inpatient’s right to a trial, with attorney representation . . . and the decision-
making power was . . . placed in the hands of judges and magistrates.”). 
 85. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210. 
 86. See id.  Nevertheless, testimony by physicians could have been thwarted by 
the fact that homosexual sex was still seen to be contrary to societal norms.  For 
example, as late as 1975, the Supreme Court ruled “there exists no right to privacy for 
homosexual conduct because homosexuality had no relationship to ‘marriage, home, 
or family life.’” David A. Catania, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
Sodomy Laws:  A Federal Common Law Right to Privacy for Homosexuals Based on 
Customary International Law, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 295-96 (1994) (quoting Doe 
v. Commonwealth, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975)). 
 87. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 211. 
 90. See id. (“[T]here was increased recognition that little effective treatment was 
being provided in many state hospitals . . . .”). 
 91. See id.; see also Testa & West, supra note 57, at 33. 
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to an era of deinstitutionalization.92  Medications permitted patients 
to live outside of psychiatric institutions.93  Thus, in the 1960s, mental 
institutions were no longer seen as an effective avenue of treatment.94  
If patients could survive in the community on medication, there was 
no rationale for civil commitment in mental institutions.95  Moreover, 
mid-twentieth century critics began to question states’ authority for 
civil commitment under parens patriae and the effectiveness of the 
treatment patients received.96  The focus of civil commitment started 
shifting from a “need for treatment” standard to a “dangerousness” 
standard.97  In other words, civil commitment required more than a 
showing that the person suffered from a mental illness; the person 
needed to be a danger to society or himself. 
The District of Columbia began implementing the “dangerousness” 
standard in 1964.98  The standard required a two-part test for a person 
to be civilly committed:  the person needed to have a mental illness 
and needed to pose an imminent threat to himself or others.99  In 
1975, the United States Supreme Court supported the idea behind the 
two-requirement test in its decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson.100  
The Court found the civil commitment of a man initially committed 
by his father to be unconstitutional because ample evidence showed 
Donaldson was not dangerous to himself or others.101  Specifically, 
the Court held “a State cannot constitutionally confine without more 
a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in 
freedom.”102  While Donaldson’s father’s opinion would have been 
sufficient in the past, here the Court increased the standard for civil 
commitment by requiring a showing of some indicia that Donaldson 
was dangerous. 
In 1979, the Supreme Court developed another procedural 
safeguard by establishing “clear and convincing evidence” as the 
                                                                                                                          
 92. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 211; see also Testa & West, supra 
note 57, at 33. 
 93. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32-33. 
 94. See id. (“The number of psychiatric inpatients declined precipitously from a 
high of more than 550,000 in 1950 to 30,000 by the 1990s.”). 
 95. See id. at 33 (“The medication was so effective in treating psychosis that the 
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considered to be lifelong hospital cases seemed plausible.”). 
 96. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 211. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 33. 
 100. 422 U.S. 563, 565 (1975). 
 101. See id. at 573. 
 102. Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
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burden of proof for civil commitment.103  The Court settled this issue 
in Addington v. Texas.104  There, Frank O’Neal Addington claimed 
that the burden of proof used to civilly commit him should not have 
been the mid-level burden, clear and convincing evidence, but instead 
the highest burden, beyond a reasonable doubt. 105   The Court 
disagreed and held that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is to 
be used when there are knowable facts.  The Court reasoned:  
“Psychiatric diagnosis, in contrast, is to a large extent based on 
medical ‘impressions’ drawn from subjective analysis and filtered 
through the experience of the diagnostician.  This process often 
makes it very difficult for the expert physician to offer definite 
conclusions about any particular patient.”106 
Thus, the Court held that the clear and convincing evidence 
standard was the correct standard to use in a court proceeding dealing 
with the civil commitment of a mentally ill person.107  While it may 
appear that this holding made it more difficult for persons to appeal 
their sentences of civil commitment, the case actually increased the 
standard in some states from the lowest standard, preponderance of 
the evidence.108  In doing so, it followed the twentieth century trend 
of making it more difficult to civilly confine mentally ill persons while 
balancing the idea that it may be impossible to civilly confine even 
those people who pose a threat to the life or safety of others if the 
standard of proof is too high. 
More recently, policymakers have started once again to assess the 
importance of the commitment of individuals who may not be 
imminently dangerous but are regularly at risk to be dangerous to 
others.109  The options for commitment have expanded and more 
focus has been put on involuntary outpatient commitment as a “less 
                                                                                                                          
 103. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 34.  There are three levels of burden of 
proof.  29 AM. JUR. 2D EVIDENCE § 173 (2016).  The lowest standard, the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, requires the fact finder to “believe that 
the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” Id.  The middle 
standard, the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, requires that the fact finder 
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a proposition is true. Id.  The highest standard, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard, requires the movant to prove every fact necessary to constitute the 
proposition beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. § 185. 
 104. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 105. See id. at 421. 
 106. Id. at 428. 
 107. See id. at 432. 
 108. See id. at 421. 
 109. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 212. 
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restrictive alternative.” 110   Nevertheless, the “dangerousness” 
standard has inadvertently excluded those with mental illnesses who 
do not present themselves to be violent while undergoing 
treatment.111  This results in many mentally ill persons becoming 
homeless or imprisoned.112  In doing so, the shift to “dangerousness” 
has served as a speedy but ultimately ineffective long-term solution 
instead of a sustainable resolution in psychiatric care.113 
B. Early Forms of Civil Commitment Laws for Sex Offenders:  
Sexual Psychopath Laws 
Initially, psychiatrists and lawmakers did not single out sex 
offenders; they were treated the same as other groups of offenders.114  
It was not until the prominence of rehabilitation 115  and, more 
powerfully, an increase in the “wave of sex crimes against young 
girls”116 that sex offenders started to be treated differently than other 
offenders.  There were five times more sex crimes reported between 
the years 1933 and 1941 than were reported between the years 1921 
and 1932.117  To be sure, it is possible that sex crimes did not actually 
increase, but rather that past sex crimes were unreported118 or that 
data was not collected regarding past sex crimes.119  Moreover, rape 
laws were sex specific, requiring “a woman resist her assailant and 
that there be corroborating evidence apart from that woman’s 
testimony.”120  This would inevitably leave out data for one of the 
most feared offenders, the child molester.121  Despite the potential 
                                                                                                                          
 110. Id.  This is considered to be less restrictive because the person is not civilly 
confined in a facility. 
 111. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 34. 
 112. See id. at 35. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and 
Pendulums:  Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 
30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 70 (2000) (explaining that sex offenders were dealt with under 
laws designed to deal with “defective delinquents” and “criminal psychopaths”). 
 115. See id. (“This was the dawning of a new rehabilitation-focused era in the U.S., 
distinguished by a turning toward medical explanations for criminal behavior and an 
orientation toward treatment goals over punishment . . . .”). 
 116. Tamara Rice Lave, Only Yesterday:  The Rise and Fall of Twentieth Century 
Sexual Psychopath Laws, 69 LA. L. REV. 549, 551 (2009). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at 553 (“Even if police departments were participating, they did not 
always report all of their arrests.”). 
 119. See id. (“The FBI could not compel police to report arrests . . . .”). 
 120. Id. at 553-54 (emphasis added). 
 121. See id. at 554 (“The FBI simply did not provide crime statistics on the most 
feared form of sexual offending:  child molestation.”).  This could have also been 
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disparities in the statistics, Americans were “outraged at what they 
saw to be an increase in sex crimes and demanded that something be 
done.” 122   Different solutions were recommended, 123  including 
legislation designed to deal specifically with sex offenders.124 
Early forms of legislation addressing sex offenders differ from 
modern civil commitment laws in that the treatment for committing a 
sex crime served as an alternative to a prison sentence.125  In other 
words, sex offenders were either treated for the mental condition that 
made them commit sex crimes or they were imprisoned for 
committing those sex crimes.126  Michigan and Illinois were the first 
states to pass such laws, known as Sexual Psychopath Laws.127  The 
statutes required a judge to conduct a review of the sex offender and 
decide if he was “feeble-minded or epileptic . . . to be psychopathic, or 
a sex degenerate, or a sex pervert, with tendencies dangerous to 
public safety.”128  If the judge found that the sex offender fit the 
criteria, the offender would be committed to a “state hospital or 
institution” until the offender was no longer a danger to society.129 
Minnesota lawmakers soon followed Michigan and Illinois and the 
state implemented its own Sexual Psychopath Law.130  Its statute was 
the first Sexual Psychopath Law to be constitutionally interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court.131  In 1940, the Supreme Court 
held in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County 
that there was a rational basis for states to create laws that specify the 
                                                                                                                          
because early child molestation occurred within the family and these were matters 
initially handled within the familial unit.  This continues to occur today. See Sexual 
Abuse, AMER. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (Nov. 2014), 
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 122. Lave, supra note 116, at 565. 
 123. See id. at 565-71 (listing some solutions such as making potential victims less 
vulnerable, treating victims with more sensitivity, and tightening control of sex 
offenders through increase police monitoring). 
 124. See id. at 571 (discussing the advent of sexual psychopath laws). 
 125. See Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment:  The Treatment 
Paradox, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2093, 2097 (2010) (explaining that modern sex offender 
commitment statutes civilly commit sex offenders after their criminal sentence is 
fulfilled). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 71 (“Michigan and Illinois—were 
in fact the first to pass these laws (1937-1938).”). 
 128. See Lave, supra note 116, at 571. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 71. 
 131. See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Ct. of Ramsey Cty., 309 U.S. 270 
(1940). 
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class of sex offenders.132   The Court reasoned that “[t]he class 
[Minnesota] did select is identified by the state court in terms which 
clearly show that the persons within that class constitute a dangerous 
element in the community which the legislature in its discretion could 
put under appropriate control.”133  Thus, laws targeting sex offenders 
are constitutional.134  More than half of the other states followed 
Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota.135  These laws went relatively 
uncontested by lawyers and psychologists.136 
Nevertheless, Sexual Psychopath Laws that targeted sex offenders 
eventually did not prove practical or popular.137  Many health experts 
realized that the laws were weak in rehabilitating the individual.138  In 
the legal realm, the Supreme Court struck down some of these laws 
due to lack of procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and 
the right to cross-examination. 139   The impracticality and 
unpopularity of these laws led to the demise of more than half of 
them by the mid-1980s.140 
The end of the Sexual Psychopath Law era also resulted from the 
minimization of the danger sex offenders posed to society.141  False 
information was released that conveyed that a sex offender was no 
more likely to reoffend than any other criminal offender.142  Thus, it is 
no surprise that these laws were repealed, in part, because the public 
was misinformed about how likely sex offenders would offend again. 
                                                                                                                          
 132. See id. at 274-75 
 133. Id. at 275. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 72. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. at 73. 
 138. See id. (“Gradually, it became clear to many mental health practitioners as 
well that the scientific/medical underpinnings that supported the earlier habilitative 
optimism and the laws it generated were weak indeed.”). 
 139. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (holding that all the 
procedural safeguards of a criminal trial were warranted in this civil-type 
proceeding); see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment self incrimination privilege did not extend to psychiatric examination). 
 140. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 73. 
 141. See id. at 74-75 (“One of the minimizers saw fit to implicitly criticize the 
passage of Indiana’s sex offender statute as ‘the direct result of almost a mass hysteria 
followed by a series of [sexually motivated] murders which occurred in the summer 
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 142. See id. at 74 (explaining that data stating that sex offenders only get in trouble 
once had been released to the public). 
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Naturally, minimizing the sex offender problem did not make it go 
away.143  The media eventually exposed the truth that sex offenders 
still posed a bigger threat to society than the public was aware of.144  
An escalation of the seriousness of offenses repeat sex offenders 
committed occurred as well.145  For example, in 1989 a man named 
Earl Shriner was released from a Washington prison after serving a 
ten-year sentence for kidnapping and sexually assaulting two 
teenagers.146  He was not eligible for civil commitment under the 
original Washington Sexual Psychopath Law.147  After his release, he 
raped a seven-year-old boy, cut off the boy’s penis, and left the boy to 
die. 148   This escalation effect and the truth that sex offenders 
continued to pose a danger to society drove the enactment of the 
modern civil commitment laws, the Sexually Violent Predator 
Laws.149 
C. Modern form of Civil Commitment Laws for Sex Offenders:  
Sexually Violent Predator Laws and the United States Supreme 
Court’s Constitutional Interpretation 
Sexually Violent Predator Laws differ from Sexual Psychopath 
Laws in that the treatment and civil commitment of the sex offender 
under Sexual Psychopath Laws occurs after a defendant has served 
his prison sentence.150  Washington was the first state to pass the 
modern form of sex offender civil commitment laws in 1990.151  
Today, twenty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal 
government have adopted similar laws.152  Though each state’s law 
                                                                                                                          
 143. See id. at 75 (“After all, minimizing a real problem does not make it go away 
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 149. See Comparet-Cassani, supra note 144, at 1060. 
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175, 176 (2008); supra Section I.B. 
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may differ in form, Washington’s preamble and statutory structure 
serve as a model for comparable statutes throughout the country.153  
In short, the preamble states “[t]he legislature finds that a small but 
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators 
exist . . . [and] generally have antisocial personality features which are 
not amenable to existing medical illness treatment modalities and 
those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent 
behavior.”154   Sexually Violent Predator Laws target repeat sex 
offenders that pose a danger to society. 
These laws differ from the previous sex offender laws where courts 
had the choice to place sex offenders either in prison or in civil 
commitment facilities.  Conversely, Sexually Violent Predator Laws 
continue the detainment of sex offenders who have already served 
their prison sentences in civil commitment facilities.155  In other 
words, the sexual offenders first serve the time for their crime and 
then are evaluated for civil commitment.156  Most states define a 
“Sexually Violent Predator” in the civil commitment statutes as a 
person “(1) who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually 
violent offense and (2) who suffers from a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder (3) that makes the person likely to engage in acts 
of sexual violence.” 157   Thus, these individuals are only civilly 
committed after their criminal sentence if a court deems them to have 
a mental abnormality that would predispose them to be a danger to 
society if released.158 
Sexually Violent Predator Laws have withstood constitutional 
challenges.  First, in 1997, the Supreme Court in Kansas v. 
Hendricks159 evaluated Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act as it 
applied to respondent Leroy Hendricks, a man with a history of 
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repeated child sexual molestation.160   Hendricks, who was being 
evaluated for civil commitment based on his past sexual crimes, the 
most recent conviction relating to “taking ‘indecent liberties’ with two 
thirteen-year-old-boys,”161  challenged the law on substantive due 
process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto claims.162  The Court held 
that the act was constitutional on all grounds.163 
First, the Court held that the Act’s definition of “mental 
abnormality” satisfied substantive due process.164  The Act defined a 
mental abnormality as a “congenital or acquired condition affecting 
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to 
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person 
a menace to the health and safety of others.”165  The Court explained 
that while all individuals have a liberty interest, “[s]tates have in 
certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible detainment of 
people who are unable to control their behavior and thereby pose a 
danger to the public health and safety.” 166   The Court further 
reasoned these statutes must contain “proper procedures and 
evidentiary standards.”167  Specifically, the Court noted it had upheld 
statutes “when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the 
proof of some additional factor, such as ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental 
abnormality.’”168  The Court thus reasoned that because the Kansas 
Act required a finding of dangerousness plus a finding that the 
respondent suffered from a mental abnormality, the Act was 
consistent with substantive due process and in line with similarly 
constitutional laws.169  Moreover, the Court found that Hendricks’ 
“urge” to molest children, with the prediction of future 
dangerousness laid out by the trial court made him an offender 
subject to this type of proceeding.170 
                                                                                                                          
 160. See id. at 350, 354. 
 161. Id. at 353. 
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The Court then evaluated Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post 
facto claims.171  Hendricks’ contention was that the Kansas Act 
essentially constituted a second criminal punishment, thereby 
establishing the double jeopardy claim.172  The Court rejected this 
argument.173  First, the Court found that the language of the statute 
did not warrant any other interpretation than intent to form a civil 
proceeding.174  Second, the Court reasoned that the Act did not 
contain the goals of retribution or deterrence,175 objectives that would 
be associated with criminal punishment.176  Additionally, the Court 
explained that the confinement of the mentally ill had always been 
considered non-punitive detention.177  Thus, the Court found that 
Kansas’ Act did not constitute double jeopardy or an ex post facto 
law.  This finding, along with the finding that the Act did not infringe 
on substantive due process, allowed the Court to hold Kansas’ Act 
constitutional. 
The second time the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality 
of a Sexually Violent Predator Law was in 2002.  Kansas v. Crane 
focused on whether or not the State must always prove that a sex 
offender has complete or total lack of control of his behavior.178  
There, the Supreme Court reviewed the civil commitment of Michael 
Crane, a convicted sex offender who suffered from exhibitionism and 
antisocial personality disorder.179  The question was whether it was 
unconstitutional to civilly commit Crane when there was no showing 
that he was unable to control his behavior.180  The Supreme Court 
ruled that it was unconstitutional because Hendricks “underscored 
                                                                                                                          
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 361. 
 173. See id. 
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the constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual 
offender ‘from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more 
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.’”181  
The Court further reasoned that a diagnosis of a serious mental 
disorder was a way to distinguish sex offenders from other offenders 
and a way to display serious difficulty in control.182  The Court 
recognized that the standard for “difficulty in control” was not a strict 
standard183 but instead reasoned that 
[t]he Constitution’s safeguards of human liberty in an area of mental 
illness and the law are not always best enforced through precise 
bright-line rules.  For one thing, the states retain considerable 
leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality 
disorders that make an individual eligible for commitment.  For 
another, the science of psychiatry, which informs but does not 
control ultimate legal determinations, is an ever-advancing science, 
whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of law.184 
In doing so, the Court once again upheld the constitutionality of a 
Sexually Violent Predator Law, but reinforced the element of 
difficulty in control that is necessary to prove in order for a sex 
offender to be eligible for civil commitment. 
1. New York’s Sexual Psychopath Law:  New York Mental Hygiene 
Law Article 10 
The history of New York’s Sexually Violent Predator Law is 
similar to Washington’s.  On June 29, 2005, Phillip Grant murdered 
Concetta Russo Carriero.  Later that day he told police “he had 
hidden in a stairwell with a knife for hours . . . waiting to kill.”185  
Grant was a level-three sex offender186  who had already served 
twenty-three years in prison for two rape convictions and an 
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attempted sexual assault conviction.187  Similarly to the people of 
Washington State, the people of New York State feared this kind of 
escalation from offenders who had already served their time.  This 
resulted in Governor Pataki’s call for legislation called “Concetta’s 
Law,” intended to serve a similar function to the Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws described above. 188   When the New York State 
Assembly and Senate were unable to agree on the legislation, 
Governor Pataki sought to have offenders civilly committed under 
Mental Hygiene Law Section 9.27.189  Mental Hygiene Law Section 
9.27(a) allows a director of a hospital to receive “any person alleged 
to be mentally ill and in need of involuntary care and treatment upon 
the certificates of two examining physicians, accompanied by an 
application for the admission of such person.”190  Mental Hygiene 
Law Section 9.27(b) provides eleven options by which the patient can 
be admitted by application, only one of which requires a court 
order.191  In this way, sex offenders can be civilly committed without 
judicial involvement and without relying on the mentally abnormality 
plus dangerousness requirements in other statutes.192 
Not long after Governor Pataki ordered the use of Mental Hygiene 
Law Section 9.27 to civilly commit sex offenders, the initiative193 was 
challenged on procedural grounds.194  In November 2005, the New 
York Court of Appeals held that it was improper to use Mental 
Hygiene Law Section 9.27 to involuntarily commit sex offenders 
because the law did not specifically permit the release of felony 
offenders from prison to a mental health institution.195  It ruled that 
                                                                                                                          
 187. See N.Y. ST. OFF. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10:  SEX OFFENDER 
MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT OF 2007 3 (2009), https://www.omh.ny.gov/
omhweb/resources/publications/2008_SOMTA_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z75H-
P284]. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. (“New York State was fairly unique in its attempt to [civilly commit 
sex offenders] through a pre-existing statute”); see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 
9.27 (McKinney 2007) (allowing the civil commitment of persons with mental illness 
upon authorization of two physicians). 
 190. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(a) (McKinney 2011). 
 191. See id. § 9.27(b). 
 192. See N.Y. ST. OFF. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 187. 
 193. See id. at 3. (“The Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) initiative in New York 
State commenced in September 2005.  Under this initiative, OMH was required to 
conduct a comprehensive record review of all sex offenders who were scheduled for 
release from DOCS.”). 
 194. State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 859 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter 
Harkavy I]. 
 195. Id. 
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Correction Law Section 402196  should have been used to civilly 
confine sex offenders instead. 197   Correction Law Section 402 
provides treatment for individuals already imprisoned and already 
psychiatrically evaluated.198  The Court of Appeals ruled that it was 
this law that provided the appropriate evaluation for sex offenders 
requiring civil commitment.199  Pending the outcome of the second 
appeal in that case, the New York Legislature passed the Sex 
Offender Management and Treatment Act.200 
The Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act is enumerated 
in Chapter 7 of the Laws of 2007.201  Commonly referred to as Article 
10, the Act dictates the process for civil commitment in New York.202  
Its focus is “to enhance public safety by continuing to treat and 
manage mentally abnormal sex offenders who are being released 
from some type of supervision . . . but remain predisposed to 
recidivate in the absence of such treatment and management.”203  
Thus, it is similar to other Sexually Violent Predator Laws in that its 
goal is to protect society from sex offenders prone to recidivism by 
keeping them in civil confinement after the fulfillment of their prison 
sentences. 
The first part of the statute presents legislative findings, mainly, 
“[t]hat recidivistic sex offenders pose a danger to society that should 
be addressed through comprehensive programs of treatment and 
management.”204  Moreover, the legislature found that “some sex 
offenders have mental abnormalities that predispose them to engage 
in repeat sex offenses.”205  Thus, the law sets out to protect the 
community from sex offenders that are diagnosed with mental 
abnormalities that make it difficult to control reoffending or 
escalating. 
In order for a sex offender to be eligible for civil commitment 
under Mental Hygiene Law Article 10, a case review team reviews a 
                                                                                                                          
 196. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 402 (McKinney 2014). 
 197. Harkavy I, 859 N.E.2d at 509 (“[W]e hold that the procedures set forth in 
Correction law § 402, rather than Mental Hygiene Law article 9, better suit this 
situation.”). 
 198. Id. at 511. 
 199. Id. at 511-12. 
 200. See N.Y. ST. OFF. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 187, at 4. 
 201. It was effective April 13, 2007. See id. at 5. 
 202. See id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2011). 
 205. Id. § 10.01(b). 
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detained sex offender’s file206 to see if he is a “dangerous sex offender 
requiring confinement.”207  The statute defines a “dangerous sex 
offender requiring confinement” as a person 
who is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental abnormality 
involving such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses, and 
such an inability to control behavior, that the person is likely to be a 
danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a 
secure treatment facility.208 
A “detained sex offender” is a person in the “care, custody, control 
or supervision of an agency with jurisdiction” that either is convicted 
or charged with a sex offense or convicted of a designated felony that 
was sexually motivated.209  Finally, a “mental abnormality” is defined 
as a “congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects 
the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a 
manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct 
constituting a sex offense and that results in that person having 
serious difficulty in controlling such conduct.”210  Thus, in order for a 
person to require civil management, the person must be a “detained 
sex offender” and have a “mental abnormality” as defined by the 
statute. 
Once it is determined that the “respondent”211 is a sex offender 
requiring civil management, the case review team refers the case to 
the New York Attorney General, who may file a sex offender civil 
commitment petition in a court with jurisdiction over where the 
respondent is located.212   The petition must allege facts “of an 
evidentiary character tending to support the allegation that the 
respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.”213  There is 
then a probable cause hearing where the court determines whether 
                                                                                                                          
 206. Id. § 10.05(e) (“[T]he case review team shall review relevant records . . . and 
may arrange for a psychiatric examination of the respondent.  Based on the review 
and assessment of such information, the case review team shall consider whether the 
respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.”). 
 207. Confinement and management are often used interchangeably with 
commitment.  This Note uses commitment for consistency purposes. 
 208. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (McKinney 2016). 
 209. Id. § 10.03(g). 
 210. Id. § 10.03(i). 
 211. Id. § 10.03(n) (defined as “a person referred to the case review team for 
evaluation, a person as to whom a sex offender civil management petition has been 
recommended by a case review team and not yet filed, or filed by the attorney 
general and not dismissed, or sustained by procedures under this article.”). 
 212. Id. § 10.06(a). 
 213. Id. 
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the respondent is such an offender.214  If the court determines that 
there is no probable cause, the petition is dismissed.215  If the court 
determines there is probable cause, the court orders the respondent 
to a secure treatment facility216 and sets a date for trial.217  The 
respondent will not be released until the end of the trial.218 
A trial must begin within sixty days of the court determining there 
is probable cause that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil 
management.219  The jury or judge220 must determine by clear and 
convincing evidence221 whether the respondent is a detained sex 
offender who suffers from a mental abnormality.222  If the jury or 
court determines that the respondent is not a sex offender who suffers 
from a mental abnormality by clear and convincing evidence, the 
petition is dismissed and the respondent is released.223  If the jury or 
court determines that the respondent is a sex offender who suffers 
from a mental abnormality, the court shall then consider whether the 
respondent is a “dangerous sex offender requiring confinement or a 
sex offender requiring strict and intensive supervision.”224  That is, the 
court will decide if the sex offender needs to be committed into a 
facility or can be released into the community under close monitoring 
and strict supervision. 
The court will determine that the respondent is a sex offender 
requiring commitment if it finds by a clear and convincing evidence 
that “respondent has a mental abnormality involving such a strong 
predisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control 
behavior, that the respondent is likely to be a danger to others and to 
commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility.”225  
If the court does not find this, then the respondent will be a “sex 
                                                                                                                          
 214. Id. § 10.06(g). 
 215. Id. § 10.06(k). 
 216. If the respondent or respondent’s counsel signs a consent to remain in the 
prison which he already resides, he may stay there until the end of the trial. See id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. 
 219. Id. § 10.07(a). 
 220. The court may make the determination at trial if a jury trial is waived. See id. 
§ 10.07(c). 
 221. The burden of proof rests on the attorney general. See id. § 10.07(d); see also 
Testa & West, supra note 57, at 34. 
 222. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2011). 
 223. Id. § 10.07(e). 
 224. Id. § 10.07(f). 
 225. See id.; see also id. § 10.10(a) (“[T]hat facility shall provide care, treatment 
and control of the respondent until such time that a court discharges the respondent 
in accordance with the provisions of this article”). 
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offender requiring strict and intensive supervision.”226  This means 
that the respondent is released, but is closely monitored in the 
community.227 
The respondent may petition for release on an annual basis.228  
When this occurs, there is an evidentiary hearing to decide whether or 
not the respondent still suffers from a mental abnormality and still 
requires civil commitment.229  If the court decides the respondent no 
longer suffers from a mental abnormality and no longer requires civil 
commitment, the court shall issue an order that discharges the 
respondent to strict intensive supervision and treatment.230  Likewise, 
the respondent may also petition for discharge on strict intensive 
supervision and treatment.  If the court finds respondent no longer 
requires civil commitment, it shall order the respondent’s 
discharge.231 
2. The New York Court of Appeals’ Interpretation of Article 10 
and Its Constitutionality In Relation to Antisocial Personality 
Disorder 
Upon the passing of Mental Hygiene Law Article 10, the New 
York Court of Appeals ruled that any respondent’s challenge to 
transfer to a secure facility under Article 9 had “been rendered 
academic.”232  Article 10 is now the law under which New York courts 
determine whether sex offenders require civil commitment once they 
near the end of their prison sentences.233  Recently, and in light of 
Kansas v. Crane, the constitutionality of Article 10 was challenged.234  
On July 26, 2002, eighteen-year-old Donald DD. had sexual 
                                                                                                                          
 226. Id. § 10.07(f); see also id. § 10.11(a) (explaining the supervision requirements 
may include but are not limited to “electronic monitoring or global positioning 
satellite tracking for an appropriate period of time, polygraph monitoring, 
specification of residence or type of residence, prohibition of contact with identified 
past or potential victims, strict and intensive supervision by a parole officer, and any 
other lawful and necessary conditions that may be imposed by a court”). 
 227. See id. § 10.11. 
 228. Id. § 10.09(a) (“The commissioner shall provide the respondent and counsel 
for the respondent with an annual written notice of the right to petition the court for 
discharge.”). 
 229. Id. § 10.09(h). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. § 10.11(h). 
 232. State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 870 N.E.2d 128, 132 (N.Y. 2007) 
[hereinafter Harkavy II.]. 
 233. See id. (stating that this included those who are petitioners in Harkavy II.). 
 234. State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239 (N.Y. 2014). 
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intercourse with a fourteen-year-old acquaintance.235  Afterwards, he 
asked the acquaintance if he could have intercourse with her twelve-
year-old cousin.236  The twelve-year-old was afraid and did not resist 
when Donald partially inserted his penis into her vagina.237  Donald 
pled guilty to rape in the second-degree,238 attempted rape in the 
second degree, and endangering the welfare of a child.239  He was 
convicted and sentenced to six months in prison and ten years 
probation in January 2004.240 
In the same year he was released,241 Donald persuaded a young 
woman to walk with him242 and then forced her to have sexual 
intercourse with him.243  Donald was subsequently arrested and pled 
guilty to sexual abuse in the second degree.244  He again served six 
months in prison, was released, but again was arrested for throwing 
rocks at an acquaintance’s car and injuring a passenger.245  This time, 
he was resentenced and convicted to one to three years of 
imprisonment.246 
A year later, Donald’s prison sentence was coming to an end, and 
he was evaluated for civil commitment under Article 10. 247  
Nevertheless, upon review, a psychiatric examiner testified that he did 
not believe Donald suffered from a mental abnormality within the 
meaning of Mental Hygiene Law Section 10.03.248  Thus, he was 
                                                                                                                          
 235. See id. at 243. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id. 
 238. Id.; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30(1) (McKinney 2009) (“[B]eing 18 years 
old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than 15 
years old.”). 
 239. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 243. 
 240. See id. 
 241. See id. at 244 (“On July 1, 2004, after release from prison, Donald DD. 
persuaded a young woman, a close friend of his wife, to accompany him on a walk to 
a local cemetery.  There, he kissed the woman and, ignoring her repeated protests, 
had sexual intercourse with her.”). 
 242. See id. 
 243. See id. 
 244. See id.; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.60 (McKinney 2009). 
 245. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 244 (“Donald DD.’s probation was revoked in the 
summer of 2006, after he was arrested following an incident in which he threw stones 
or rocks at an acquaintance’s car, injuring a passenger.”). 
 246. See id. 
 247. It was then 2008; Donald DD. had not been evaluated under the law prior to 
this was because MHL Article 10 was not enacted until 2007. See N.Y. ST. OFF. OF 
MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 187, at 5. 
 248. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 244 (“A psychiatric examiner, Dr. Mark 
Cederbaum, opined that Donald DD. suffered from ASPD, but did not have a mental 
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conditionally released to parole.249  His parole terms indicated that he 
could not contact anyone under eighteen without the presence of an 
adult.250  Nevertheless, his children alleged that he was alone with 
them and he “had touched their ‘privates’ and encouraged them to 
touch each other’s and his ‘privates.’”251  His parole was thus revoked 
and he was returned to prison to serve the remainder of his 2007 
maximum sentence. 252   In June 2009, another civil commitment 
proceeding began against Donald as he was nearing the end of his 
sentence.253  Donald was committed to a secure treatment facility 
after the court found probable cause that he was a sex offender 
requiring civil commitment.254  A jury trial began in March 2010.255 
At trial, the State presented two psychologists who testified that 
Donald suffered from antisocial personality disorder. 256   The 
psychologists testified that this disorder resulted in a pattern of 
disregard for others and disregard for the law.257  One psychologist 
believed Donald suffered from all seven traits listed under the ASPD 
diagnosis and the other believed he suffered from at least six.258  
Nevertheless, one of the psychologists testified that “a very small 
portion of individuals with antisocial personality disorders . . . are 
actually incarcerated for a sexual offense.” 259   He testified that 
approximately seven percent of those diagnosed with ASPD are 
probably incarcerated for a sexual offense because “[s]ome with 
antisocial personality disorder commit sex offenses and some 
don’t.”260  That same doctor believed that in Donald’s case, his 
diagnosis of ASPD predisposed him to commit sex offenses and 
                                                                                                                          
abnormality within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03(i).”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 249. See id. (“Donald DD. was conditionally released to parole supervision in June 
2008.”). 
 250. See id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See id. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. (“The State presented two licensed psychologists, Dr. Christopher 
Kunkle and Dr. Richard Hamill, as witnesses, both of whom had interviewed Donald 
DD. and reviewed his records.”). 
 257. See id. (“[They both] opined that Donald DD. suffered from ASPD . . . . 
[and] . . . described the disorder as ‘characterized by a pervasive pattern of disregard 
for others and violation of the law.’”). 
 258. See id. at 245. 
 259. See id. 
 260. Id. 
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caused him to have “serious difficulty in controlling his sex-offending 
conduct.”261  The other psychologist testified similarly, stating, “the 
large majority, 93 percent of those diagnoses with [ASPD], are not 
sex offenders.”262  He then similarly stated that ASPD predisposed 
Donald to engage in conduct constituting a sex offense and resulting 
in his serious difficulty in controlling his sex-offending conduct.263  
The psychologists’ statements support the idea that ASPD can 
manifest in many ways, and in Donald’s case, their opinion was that it 
manifested as an uncontrollable impulse that made it safer to confine 
him to protect himself and others. 
The State called a third psychologist as a witness.264  This doctor 
testified that Donald was an opportunistic offender.265  He stated that 
the ASPD diagnosis was not specific to one’s sexual impulses.266  He 
stated, “I would say the vast majority of individuals in all the state 
prisons in this state could be diagnosed with antisocial personality 
disorder.  By definition they all have difficulty conforming their 
behavior to the law.”267  Thus, the third psychologist’s testimony 
reflected the opinion that Donald’s ASPD did not qualify him as a sex 
offender requiring civil commitment under Article 10.268 
The jury at trial found that Donald had a “condition, disease or 
disorder that predisposed him to the commission of conduct 
constituting a sex offense and result[ed] in his having serious difficulty 
in controlling such conduct.”269  Donald then moved to set aside the 
                                                                                                                          
 261. Id. (“In [Donald DD.’s] case, his disorder predisposes him in a way because 
his behavior has shown you that.  His behavior has shown you what goes on inside his 
mind, and he acts upon the urges that he has . . . he acts upon that urge and neglects 
the laws that govern.”). 
 262. Id. 
 263. See id. (“[H]e opined that ASPD predisposed Donald DD. to engage in 
conduct constituting a sex offense . . . .[and] . . . that Donald DD.’s ASPD resulted in 
his having serious difficulty in controlling his sexual-offending conduct.”). 
 264. See id. 
 265. See id. at 246. 
 266. Id. (“He explained that ASPD can act ‘in combination with . . . a diagnosable 
sexual disorder, and . . . can add extra fuel to the fire, if you will,’ but cannot ‘in and 
of itself . . . predict sexual impulse control.’”). 
 267. See id. 
 268. Differing opinions between mental health professionals regarding ASPD are 
not uncommon. See Kathleen Wayland & Sean D. O’Brien, Deconstructing 
Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy:  A Guidelines-Based Approach to 
Prejudicial Psychiatric Labels, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 519, 542 (2013) (“[T]he diagnosis 
of ASPD specifically . . . [has] been the subject of multiple critiques and debate, and 
these issues are not settled in the mental health field.”). 
 269. See Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 246; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW  
§ 10.03(i) (McKinney 2016). 
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verdict, but this was denied.270  Donald grounded his argument in the 
fact that “ASPD is an inapplicable predicate for a finding of mental 
abnormality because it is ‘not a sexual disorder.’”271  The Court 
denied the motion and ordered Donald to be civilly confined.272  
Donald appealed,273 but the Appellate Division affirmed, holding, “a 
mental condition need not itself have any sexual component in order 
to predispose a person to the commission of conduct constituting a 
sex offense and result in that person’s having serious difficulty in 
controlling such conduct.”274  Donald appealed again to the New 
York Court of Appeals. 275 
The Court of Appeals reversed the Supreme Court and Appellate 
Division’s decisions.276  It focused on the constitutionality of civilly 
confining a sex offender based on the diagnosis of ASPD.277  The 
Court referred to Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane when 
evaluating Donald’s claim that a diagnosis of ASPD was insufficient 
to civilly confine a sex offender.278  The Court emphasized that in 
both cases, the United States Supreme Court explained that the 
mental abnormality the sex offender is suffering from must 
distinguish him “from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in 
an ordinary criminal case.” 279   This distinction is important in 
ensuring civil commitment does not act as a device for punitive 
measures or deterrence.280  The Court of Appeals held, based on the 
constitutional requirements set by Hendricks and Crane as well as the 
statistics281 of those in the prison population suffering from ASPD, 
that ASPD alone “simply does not distinguish the sex offender whose 
mental abnormality subjects him to civil commitment from the typical 
                                                                                                                          
 270. See Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 246. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. 
 273. See id. (“Donald DD. appealed, again challenging the use of ASPD as a basis 
for the jury’s finding of mental abnormality.”). 
 274. See id. 
 275. See id. at 247. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. at 249. 
 278. See id. 
 279. Id. at 250 (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)). 
 280. Id. at 249. 
 281. See id. (explaining that one of the psychologist’s testimony in the Kenneth T. 
case stated that around eighty percent of the people currently in prison suffer from 
ASPD); see also supra notes 259-62. 
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recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”282  Thus, the Court 
of Appeals held that Donald’s ASPD diagnosis and evidence of sex 
crimes was not sufficient for Donald to be subject to civil confinement 
if there was no other independent mental abnormality diagnosis to go 
along with it.283  Thirteen sex offenders have since been released 
pursuant to the decision in Donald DD.284 
II.  ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER AND DISTINGUISHING 
THE SEX OFFENDER FROM THE TYPICAL CRIMINAL RECIDIVIST 
Part II describes the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.  It 
also illuminates the manner in which different jurisdictions have used 
the diagnosis in evaluating respondents under Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws.  Though not many jurisdictions have been as explicit 
as New York regarding the diagnosis’ sufficiency for civil 
commitment, some jurisdictions permit the use of ASPD alone as a 
condition sufficient for civil commitment.  Most jurisdictions that 
have had the opportunity to evaluate the sufficiency of ASPD for civil 
commitment permit it, so long as there is other evidence that the 
respondents’ diagnosis supports his propensity to commit sexually 
violent offenses.285  Section II.A provides an explanation of how 
                                                                                                                          
 282. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 249-50 (“We must interpret the Mental Hygiene 
Law article 10 statute on the assumption that it accords with these constitutional 
requirements.”). 
 283. Id. at 251.  During the pendency of writing this Note, the New York Court of 
Appeals decided State v. Dennis K., which again addressed the sufficiency of a 
diagnosis of ASPD to constitute mental abnormality under Article 10. 59 N.E.3d 500 
(N.Y. 2016).  In sum and substance, the case clarified that Donald DD. did not 
require that a sex offender suffer from a sexual disorder. See id. at 517.  Moreover, 
the case declared that sex offenders who are diagnosed with ASPD and some other 
disorder may be eligible for civil commitment. See id. at 521.  Dennis K. does not 
affect the argument of this Note. 
 284. Associated Press, NY frees “antisocial personality disorder” sex offenders, 
ONEIDA DAILY DISPATCH (June 1, 2015), http://www.oneidadispatch.com/
article/OD/20150601/NEWS/150609993 [https://perma.cc/ZYV9-FV8D]. 
 285. The analysis in this Part focuses on jurisdictions that have been explicit in 
evaluating antisocial personality disorder under Hendricks and Crane.  While there 
may be more cases and jurisdictions that implicitly accept or reject ASPD as a 
sufficient condition for a mental abnormality, the focus on those that are explicit is 
done for clarity.  For example, the Supreme Court of California published a decision, 
People v. Williams, which affirmed a judgment that civilly committed a sex offender 
who was diagnosed with “psychosis, paranoia and severe antisocial personality 
disorder.” 74 P.3d 779, 792-93 (Cal. 2003).  Although the California Supreme Court 
implicitly ASPD as a condition sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender, it also came 
to this conclusion based on the other diagnoses, psychosis and paranoia.  
Furthermore, it did not make any explicit statement that ASPD could be a condition 
sufficient for civil commitment.  Thus, in order to avoid making broad generalizations 
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ASPD and psychological diagnoses are used in civil commitment 
proceedings.  Section II.B discusses how different jurisdictions286 use 
the diagnosis of ASPD when evaluating a sex offender under a 
Sexually Violent Predator Law. 
A. Antisocial Personality Disorder:  Its Definition and its Relation 
to the Law 
Antisocial personality disorder is defined in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5 (“DSM-5”) as “a pervasive 
pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that 
begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into 
adulthood.”287  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM”) “defines and classifies mental disorders in order 
to improve diagnoses, treatment, and research.”288  The DSM has 
been “widely accepted and relied on in both civil and criminal 
proceedings.”289  Mental health practitioners usually use the DSM to 
determine if a person has a certain diagnosis under the applicable 
law.290 
Nevertheless, there is criticism as to how much courts should rely 
on the DSM in legal proceedings.291  In the most recent edition, DSM-
5, there is a cautionary note for forensic use.  It recognizes that the 
DSM is used for forensic purposes but warns that no diagnosis under 
the DSM implies that a condition meets any legal criteria.  The 
cautionary statement explains that this is a result of “the imperfect fit 
between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the 
information contained in a clinical diagnosis.”292  A Nevada Supreme 
Court case, Dodd v. Hughes, explained that “[t]he judicial inquiry is 
                                                                                                                          
about jurisdictions’ views on ASPD and civil commitment, this Note will use cases 
that are explicit in their findings. 
 286. Specifically, this Part will focus on decisions published by the highest court in 
each state.  While opinions regarding this issue may differ among lower courts in each 
state, this Note focuses on the highest court in each state because “[a] state court of 
last resort is the ultimate judicial arbiter of the interpretation and application of the 
laws of that state.” See TONI JAEGER-FINE, AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS:  A 
RESOURCE AND REFERENCE GUIDE 49 (Lexis Nexis ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
 287. See DSM-5, supra note 20, at 659. 
 288. About DSM-5:  Development of DSM-5, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/about-dsm 
[https://perma.cc/WQ2N-3HTG]. 
 289. Jessica Ferranti, DSM-5:  Development and Implementation, in THE DSM-5 
AND THE LAW:  CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 18 (Charles Scott ed., 2015). 
 290. See id. 
 291. See id. 
 292. See DSM-5, supra note 20, at 25. 
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not to be limited so as to exclude the totality of circumstances 
involved in the particular case before the court”293 when evaluating 
the significance of medical testimony in relation to a DSM 
diagnosis.294  The United States Supreme Court later opined similarly 
of the risks of the trier of fact misapplying testimony of medical 
experts in Clark v. Arizona. 295   Thus, the Court advised that 
psychiatric diagnoses in the DSM should be used in conjunction with 
the totality of the circumstances of a particular case.296 
Although the Supreme Court ruled in Hendricks that a DSM 
diagnosis is not necessary or sufficient to show a respondent suffers 
from a mental abnormality,297 courts and expert witnesses often use 
the DSM as a reference when diagnosing sexually violent 
predators. 298   In determining if a person suffers from ASPD, 
psychologists and psychiatrists look for a repetitive pattern of 
behavior in which a person violates the basic rights of others.299  
Significantly, a feature associated with ASPD is that those diagnosed 
with the disorder “may engage in sexual behavior . . . that has a high 
risk for harmful consequences.”300  Though some cases analyzed in 
this Note will have used the DSM-IV and the DSM-IV-TR—previous 
editions of the DSM—the definition of ASPD has not changed in 
substance in the transition to the DSM-5.301 
                                                                                                                          
 293. Dodd v. Hughes, 398 P.2d 540, 542 (Nev. 1965). 
 294. See Ferranti, supra note 289, at 19. 
 295. 548 U.S. 735, 778 (2006) (“[E]mpirical and conceptual problems add up to a 
real risk that an expert’s judgment in giving capacity evidence will come with an 
apparent authority that psychologists and psychiatrists do not claim to have.”). 
 296. This is important in the context of Donald DD., where it may be argued that 
the New York Court of Appeals did not use the totality of the circumstances in 
conjunction with the DSM diagnosis, ASPD.  This Part shows that jurisdictions have 
used the totality of the circumstances presented in individual cases along with the 
DSM diagnosis of ASPD and have concluded that a sex offender should be subject to 
civil commitment. 
 297. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (“Legal definitions . . . must 
‘take into account such issues as individual responsibility . . . and competency,’ [but] 
need not mirror those advanced by the medical profession.”). 
 298. See Frierson, supra note 152, at 86 (“Prior to DSM-5’s release, DSM-IV-TR 
paraphilias were some of the most common mental disorders noted to impair an 
individual’s ability to control their sexual behavior.”). 
 299. See DSM-5, supra note 20, at 659. 
 300. Id. at 660. 
 301. Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 20, at 701 (“The essential feature of 
Antisocial Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation 
of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues 
into adulthood.”), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-IV 645 (4th ed. 1994) (“The essential feature of 
Antisocial Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation 
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B. Jurisdictional Analysis of ASPD as a Condition Sufficient under 
Sexually Violent Predator Laws 
Jurisdictions continue to use ASPD as a condition sufficient to 
civilly commit a sex offender even after the finding that the sex 
offender needs to be distinguished from the typical criminal recidivist.  
Generally, jurisdictions require some evidence in addition to ASPD, 
such as a past record of repeat sexual offenses, to support the 
diagnosis under the Sexually Violent Predator Laws. 
1. Iowa:  Individual Inquiry 
The State of Iowa accepts the use of ASPD as a condition sufficient 
for civil commitment so long as all other components of the Sexually 
Violent Predator Law are met.  In doing so, Iowa uses an 
individualized inquiry to evaluate whether a specific offender’s 
diagnosis of ASPD makes him prone to committing sexually violent 
offenses if not civilly confined. 
Iowa permits the diagnosis of ASPD to be a condition sufficient 
under Iowa’s Sexually Violent Predator Act so long as “all elements 
of the statute are met.”302  Iowa’s Sexually Violent Predator Act 
requires a finding that a respondent was “convicted of or charged 
with a sexually violent offense” and that he “suffers from a mental 
abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory 
acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure 
facility.”303  Thus, so long the diagnosis makes an offender likely to 
engage in sexually violent acts, ASPD may be used in Iowa as a 
condition sufficient for civil commitment. 
In In re Detention of Barnes, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the 
contention that ASPD “renders the statute overly broad and violates 
due process.”304  The Court evaluated Allen Albert Barnes under 
Iowa’s Sexually Violent Predator Act and under Kansas v. Crane.305  
At thirteen, Barnes sexually molested his nephew.306  In 1981 he 
committed voyeurism.307  In 1985, Barnes was convicted of three 
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into adulthood.”) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
 302. In re Det. of Hodges, 689 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Iowa 2004).  See also In re Det. of 
Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Iowa 2004). 
 303. IOWA CODE § 229A.2(1211) (2015). 
 304. In re Barnes, 689 N.W.2d at 456. 
 305. Id. at 457-60. 
 306. Id. at 456. 
 307. Id.; see also IOWA CODE § 709.21 (2008) (defining voyeurism as when “[a] 
person . . . knowingly views, photographs, or films another person, for the purpose of 
arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person . . . [and] . . . (a) the other 
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counts of third-degree sexual abuse and imprisoned until 1990 for 
raping three different women at knifepoint.308  In 1996, Barnes was 
convicted of third degree sexual abuse when he forced his way into a 
woman’s home and raped her.309  In 2001, when his prison sentence 
was coming to an end, the State of Iowa filed a petition to civilly 
confine Barnes.310 
Barnes argued that he could not be civilly committed under his 
diagnosis of ASPD because “this diagnosis is not correlated with sex-
offending and . . . forty to sixty percent of the prison population has 
this diagnosis.”311  He also argued that this diagnosis did not indicate 
whether or not he had difficulty in controlling himself from 
committing a future offense.312  The Iowa Supreme Court rejected 
these arguments.  First, the Court reasoned that the statute does not 
require “that the condition affect the emotional or volitional capacity 
of every person who is afflicted with the disorder or condition; the 
requirement is that it has that effect on the particular individual 
subject to commitment.”313  The Court deferred to the trial court in 
holding that Barnes’ ASPD constituted a mental abnormality under 
the statute.314  Second, the Court reasoned that the statute did not 
require the mental abnormality to be specific toward sexual 
offenses.315  In so ruling, the Court pronounced:  “We think this 
individualized inquiry comports with the requirements of due process 
because it ultimately serves to limit civil commitment to dangerous 
sexual offenders.  At the same time, it protects those persons inflicted 
with antisocial personality disorder who are not predisposed to 
commit sexual offenses from commitment.”316   
Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the civil commitment of 
Barnes using the individualized inquiry of how Barnes’ ASPD 
affected him in the context of committing sex offenses.  Iowa has 
                                                                                                                          
person does not have knowledge about and does not consent or is unable to consent 
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 308. In re Barnes, 689 N.W.2d at 456. 
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 310. Id. at 457. 
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 313. Id. at 459. 
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consistently evaluated ASPD in this way under its Sexually Violent 
Predator Act.317 
2. Kansas:  Individual Inquiry 
ASPD is also allowed as a condition sufficient under Kansas’ 
Sexually Violent Predator Law.  The State of Kansas uses an 
individualized inquiry similar to the one Iowa follows.  Importantly, 
the language of Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Statute was the 
same language the Supreme Court evaluated in Kansas v. Crane—the 
case that the New York Court of Appeals in Donald DD. used to 
determine that ASPD alone is insufficient for civil commitment.  The 
Kansas Supreme Court has focused on the language of whether or not 
the mental abnormality “makes him or her likely to engage in repeat 
acts of sexual violence, such that he or she or the acts pose ‘a menace 
to the health and safety of others.’”318  If the respondent’s mental 
abnormality satisfies that language, the respondent is subject to civil 
commitment. 
Richard A. Miller appealed his order of civil commitment based on 
multiple claims.319  Relevant to the ASPD inquiry, Miller claimed that 
he could not be civilly committed because he was never diagnosed 
with a disorder that was specific to a sex-related abnormality.320  
Miller was a repeat sex offender321 that was diagnosed with ASPD.322  
                                                                                                                          
 317. See e.g., Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Linn Cty., 879 N.W.2d 634, 639 n.1 (Iowa 
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 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 628-29. 
 322. Id. at 629. 
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He claimed that that disorder alone did not distinguish him from the 
dangerous typical recidivist.323  Nevertheless, the Kansas Supreme 
Court maintained that the “language of the statute is clear” and “does 
not narrowly define mental abnormality as a sex-related disorder.  It 
provides for the commitment of a sex offender with any mental 
abnormality . . . that makes him or her more likely to engage in repeat 
acts of sexual violence . . . .”324  Thus, Miller’s civil commitment was 
upheld.  However, the Court made it clear that “[n]ot every sex 
offender whose diagnosis matches Miller’s will necessarily qualify as a 
sexually violent predator under the Act, but Miller received all the 
process due to him under the Act and the federal Constitution.”325  In 
doing so, the Kansas Supreme Court emphasized that an individual 
inquiry is best suited for sex offenders that are diagnosed with ASPD. 
3. Minnesota:  Individual Inquiry 
Minnesota differs from the other states discussed in Section II.B 
because its Supreme Court accepted ASPD as a condition sufficient 
for a mental abnormality before Kansas v. Crane.326  Nevertheless, 
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed this use of 
ASPD in an individualized inquiry of the sex offender after Kansas v. 
Crane was decided. 
In In re Linehan, Dennis Darol Linehan contended that 
Minnesota’s Sexually Violent Predator Act was unconstitutional.327  
Linehan’s sexual offenses began in his teens.  In 1956, when he was 
fifteen, he pulled down the shorts of a four-year-old girl and in 1960, 
when he was nineteen, he had statutorily raped one thirteen-year-old 
girl and raped another girl.328  In 1965, Linehan killed a fourteen-
                                                                                                                          
 323. Id. at 633.  Importantly, this is the language of the New York Court of 
Appeals. See State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 250 (N.Y. 2014) (“A diagnosis of 
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 324. In re Miller, 210 P.3d at 634 (emphasis in original). 
 325. Id. 
 326. See In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 878 (Minn. 1999) (“The district court 
found that appellant clearly meets all of the prongs of the SDP Act:  he has a long 
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Act.”). 
 327. Id. at 869. 
 328. Id. 
904 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
year-old girl while attempting to sexually assault her.329  Before he 
was arrested, Linehan committed two more sexual assaults, one of 
which was rape.330  Linehan was sentenced to forty years in prison, 
but in 1975 he escaped and assaulted a twelve-year-old.331  He was 
returned to prison five years later.332 
When his prison term was coming to an end in 1992, the State of 
Minnesota moved to civilly commit Linehan under the Psychopathic 
Personality Commitment Act,333 but failed because there was no 
evidence that he had “utter lack of power to control (his or her) 
sexual impulses.” 334   Nevertheless, Linehan remained under 
“intensive supervised release.”335  In 1994, Minnesota enacted the 
Sexually Dangerous Person Act and the State again moved to have 
Linehan civilly committed.336  The trial court concluded after a sixty-
day review hearing that Linehan was a sexually dangerous person 
eligible for civil commitment.337 
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Minnesota law based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. 
Hendricks because the Minnesota act “mirror[ed] the Kansas Act.”338  
The Court also upheld Linehan’s civil commitment because he was 
found to meet all prongs of Minnesota’s Act:  “he has a long history 
of engaging in harmful sexual behavior, he suffers from . . . antisocial 
personality disorder, and he is highly likely to engage in acts of 
harmful sexual conduct in the future.”339  Thus, the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota implicitly held that ASPD was a condition sufficient for 
civil commitment. 
                                                                                                                          
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
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 332. Id. 
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The Eighth Circuit reviewed Linehan’s case again in 2003.  In 
Linehan v. Milczark, Linehan filed a petition for habeas corpus to 
seek release from civil commitment under Minnesota’s Sexually 
Violent Predator Law.340  Among Linehan’s contentions was that he 
was unconstitutionally confined because he was only diagnosed with 
ASPD.341  Since Linehan’s petition was filed after Kansas v. Crane he 
attempted to argue that, “Crane limited the kind of mental disorders 
that can serve as a predicate for civil commitment to those severe in 
nature, at the far end of an inability to control scale.”342  He argued, 
that because forty to sixty percent of the male population could be 
diagnosed with ASPD, he was not sufficiently distinguished from the 
ordinary recidivist.343  The Eighth Circuit refuted this by examining 
the twenty-six page initial commitment order and memorandum the 
trial court filed.344  This, along with Linehan’s inability to control 
himself during familial visits345 and his behavior toward hospital and 
prison staff, convinced the Eighth Circuit that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court had sufficient evidence beyond Linehan’s diagnosis 
that he was a sexually violent predator.346  Thus, the Eighth Circuit 
ruled Minnesota did not unreasonably apply the Sexually Violent 
Predator Act to Linehan’s case.347 
4. Missouri:  Past Sexually Violent Behavior 
Missouri permits ASPD to qualify as a mental abnormality under 
its Sexually Violent Predator Statute so long as there is evidence “of a 
link between ASPD and sexually violent behavior.”348 
Mark Murrell challenged the State of Missouri’s petition to civilly 
commit him in 2000.349  One of his main contentions was that ASPD 
could not suffice as a mental abnormality under Missouri’s Sexually 
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 345. Id. (“Although the visiting time was limited, he left his wife and stepdaughter 
to go masturbate after some physical play with the young girl”). 
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Violent Predator statute.350  Murrell’s criminal history began when he 
was a teenager.351  By the time he was fifteen years old, he had 
already been in two different juvenile facilities.352  When he was 
eighteen, he was arrested on an aggravated battery charge.353  Three 
months after he was released on that charge, he kidnapped two 
women at gunpoint and raped them.354  In 1980, Murrell pled guilty to 
the rape.355  He was released on parole in 1991, but it was revoked for 
driving while intoxicated, unlawful use of a weapon, and possession of 
a controlled substance.356  He was released again in 1995, but four 
months later he pled guilty to child molestation in the second degree 
for fondling the breasts of a thirteen-year-old girl.357  Murrell was 
scheduled for release on April 4, 2000, but the State of Missouri filed 
a petition for civil commitment on February 28, 2000.358 
Before his civil commitment proceeding, a forensic psychologist 
diagnosed Murrell with depressive disorder, polysubstance 
dependence, and ASPD.359  The psychologist testified that his ASPD 
made it more likely than not that Murrell would engage “in predatory 
acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.”360  Another 
psychologist opined similarly that Murrell’s ASPD predisposed him 
to commit sexually violent offenses and caused him serious difficulty 
in controlling his behavior. 361   Murrell’s psychologist opined 
differently; he did not believe that Murrell suffered from a mental 
abnormality under Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predator statute 
because ASPD does not necessarily cause sexual urges.362  The jury 
nevertheless found Murrell to be a sexually violent predator.363 
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld Murrell’s civil 
commitment.364  It specifically addressed the issue of whether ASPD 
can qualify as a mental abnormality and whether it can provide 
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sufficient evidence for a jury to find an offender is more likely than 
not to sexually offend.365  After reviewing Kansas v. Crane, the Court 
held that mental abnormality under the Sexually Violent Predator 
statute need only “evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a 
present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in 
the future if the person is not incapacitated.”366  It is not necessary 
that the mental abnormality itself predispose a person to commit 
sexually violent offenses.367 
The Supreme Court of Missouri conceded that a sole diagnosis of 
ASPD without past sexual history would not qualify as a mental 
abnormality under the statute.368  Nevertheless, it reasoned “[s]imply 
because ASPD cannot in every case be enough . . . does not make it 
‘too imprecise.’  If ASPD is linked with sexually violent behavior, it 
can provide the basis for commitment.”369  In Murrell’s case, his 
ASPD distinguished him from the typical recidivist because there was 
evidence of past sexually violent behavior. 370   Thus, his mental 
abnormality of ASPD made him a sexually violent predator under 
Missouri’s statute.371 
5. North Dakota:  Nexus Between Disorder and Future 
Dangerousness 
North Dakota allows the diagnosis of ASPD so long as there is a 
“causal relationship or nexus between an individual’s [ASPD] and 
dangerousness which establishes a likelihood of reoffending.” 372  
G.R.H. appealed an order civilly committing him as a sexually 
dangerous individual in North Dakota.373  In 1994, he was convicted 
of gross sexual imposition374 after engaging in sexual acts with a 
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victim less than fifteen years old.375  He was released from custody in 
1999 but was charged with corruption or solicitation of a minor,376 
delivery of alcohol to a minor, and failing to register as a sex offender 
twenty days later. 377   His probation was revoked and he was 
imprisoned until 2004.378 
Before he was released, the State’s Attorney petitioned to have 
G.R.H. civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual under 
North Dakota’s Sexually Violent Predator Law.379  The trial court 
found G.R.H. “engaged in sexually predatory conduct and has a 
congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by an anti-social 
personality disorder that makes [him] likely to engage in further acts 
of sexually predatory conduct which constitutes a danger to the 
physical or mental health or safety of others.”380  Thus G.R.H. was 
civilly committed under North Dakota’s Sexually Violent Predator 
Law. 
On appeal, one of G.R.H’s main arguments was that his civil 
commitment “violate[d] due process and double jeopardy provisions 
of the state and federal constitutions”381 because it was based on his 
diagnosis of ASPD and it ignored his ability to control his 
behavior.  He claimed that under Kansas v. Crane, his diagnosis of 
ASPD did not distinguish him from the typical recidivist and also did 
not establish a lack of ability to control his behavior.382  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court rejected these arguments after evaluating 
Hendricks, Crane, and the North Dakota Sexually Violent Predator 
Act.383 
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed that Crane stated that 
the sex offender must be distinguished from the typical recidivist, but 
also reinforced the fact that “states have considerable leeway to 
define mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an 
individual eligible for involuntary civil commitment.”384  Moreover, 
the Court stated that other courts that have applied Crane have 
required “a nexus between a disorder and future dangerousness, 
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which, in turn, provides proof that the individual has serious difficulty 
controlling his behavior.”385  Thus, G.R.H.’s ASPD had to have a 
causal relationship with his dangerousness in order for G.R.H. to be 
civilly committed.  The Court held that the two expert psychologists 
that testified that G.R.H. suffered from a serious lack of ability to 
control his behavior at trial was sufficient for the trial court to find by 
clear and convincing evidence that G.R.H. was a sexually dangerous 
individual.386  In doing so, the North Dakota Supreme Court accepted 
ASPD as a condition sufficient for a mental abnormality under North 
Dakota’s Sexually Violent Predator Law. 
III.  ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER SHOULD BE A 
CONDITION SUFFICIENT TO CIVILLY COMMIT A SEX OFFENDER 
Part III explains why there should not be a bright-line rule banning 
the use of ASPD on its own as a condition sufficient to civilly commit 
a sex offender.  First, this Part rebuts the New York Court of 
Appeals’ argument that a diagnosis of ASPD alone does not 
distinguish the sex offender from the typical recidivist.  This is shown 
in the Supreme Court’s warning against using bright-line rules in this 
specific area of law and is shown in subsequent New York decisions 
that comment on the reasoning in Donald DD.  It is additionally 
shown in reviewing the purpose of Sexually Violent Predator Laws 
and in reviewing other courts’ treatment of ASPD as a sufficient 
diagnosis.  Part III also argues for a totality of the circumstances, or 
individualized inquiry approach when evaluating whether a sex 
offender diagnosed with ASPD should be civilly committed.  This is 
demonstrated by an analogy to searches conducted under the Fourth 
Amendment, which displays that totality of the circumstances is often 
used in areas where the police powers of the state and the liberty 
interests of the individual are intertwined. 
A. ASPD Can Distinguish the Sex Offender from the Typical 
Recidivist 
The Supreme Court specifically warned against using bright-line 
rules in the Kansas v. Crane.  In doing so, the Supreme Court left 
open the possibility that a sole diagnosis of ASPD can be sufficient to 
distinguish a sex offender from a typical recidivist.  This Section 
reviews Kansas v. Crane and New York decisions subsequent to 
Donald DD. that disagree with the case’s reasoning.  These opinions 
warn against excluding the sole diagnosis of ASPD from ever being 
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sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender.  Finally, this Section 
explains how permitting ASPD as a condition sufficient for civil 
commitment is not inconsistent with the purpose of Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws and reinforces the idea that other states have already 
accepted ASPD as a condition sufficient for civil commitment.  Thus, 
ASPD can be a condition sufficient to distinguish the sex offender 
from the typical recidivist. 
1. Kansas v. Crane Leaves Open the Possibility that ASPD Can Be 
a Condition Sufficient for Civil Commitment 
It is true Kansas v. Crane clarified the constitutionality of Sexually 
Violent Predator Laws by requiring that there be a showing of some 
type of “special and serious lack of ability to control behavior.”387  
Nevertheless, the Court did not define what “lack of control” means 
within the context of civil commitment.  It stated, “[we] did not give 
the phrase ‘lack of control’ a particularly narrow or technical 
meaning.  And we recognize that in cases where lack of control is at 
issue, ‘inability to control behavior’ will not be demonstrable by 
mathematical precision.”388   The Court further explained that it 
would be enough to show there is “lack of control” if the mental 
abnormality presented in the offender distinguishes him “from the 
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal 
case.”389  Thus, the New York Court of Appeals was correct in 
delineating the issue in Donald DD. to be whether Donald DD.’s 
diagnosis distinguished him from the typical recidivist.390 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continued to explain the 
constitutional standard, or lack thereof, of “lack of control” in civil 
commitment proceedings.  It stated: 
We recognize that Hendricks as so read provides a less precise 
constitutional standard than would those more definite rules for 
which the parties have argued.  But the Constitution’s safeguards of 
human liberty in the area of mental illness and the law are not 
always best enforced through precise bright-line rules.391 
Moreover, the Supreme Court insisted the states had “considerable 
leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality disorders 
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that make an individual eligible for commitment.”392   Thus, the 
Supreme Court did not specifically define which mental disorders 
would qualify under the civil commitment statutes.  The Court instead 
suggested that no bright-line rules be developed in this area of the 
law. 
In fact, the respondent in Crane suffered from ASPD and another 
psychological disorder, exhibitionism. 393   However, the Supreme 
Court did not hold either diagnosis insufficient to civilly commit a sex 
offender.394  Instead, it called for a finding that the respondent had 
difficulty in controlling his behavior and remanded the case.395  The 
Supreme Court therefore had the opportunity to declare ASPD 
insufficient to qualify as a mental abnormality under Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws—but did not.396  Thus, in declaring that ASPD can 
never be sufficient under Article 10,397 the New York Court of 
Appeals toed the line of creating a bright-line rule in an area of law 
where the Supreme Court specifically warned against it and where the 
Supreme Court had the chance to address it. 
2. Subsequent New York Case Law Alludes that ASPD Can Be a 
Condition Sufficient to Civilly Commit a Sex Offender 
Subsequent decisions in New York Courts have had difficulty 
reconciling Donald DD.’s interpretation that ASPD can never be a 
condition sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender.  In fact, a few 
decisions openly disagree with the Court of Appeals’ approach.  
                                                                                                                          
 392. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359). 
 393. Id. at 411 (explaining that Crane suffered from both ASPD and 
exhibitionism).  Exhibitionistic disorder is defined in the DSM-5 as having a “sexual 
attraction to exposing . . . [one’s] genitals to unsuspecting persons.” See DSM-5, 
supra note 20, at 689. 
 394. Crane, 541 U.S. at 413 (“For one thing, the States retain considerable leeway 
in defining the mental and personality disorders that make an individual eligible for 
commitment.”). 
 395. Id. at 412 (“We do not agree with the State, however, insofar as it seeks to 
claim that the Constitution permits commitment of the type of dangerous sex 
offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination.”). 
 396. Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Expert Testimony in Sexually Violent Predator 
Commitments:  Conceptualizing Legal Standards of “Mental Disorder” and “Likely 
to Reoffend,” 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 471, 474 (2003) (“Although [there] 
was an opportunity for the court to address whether Antisocial Personality Disorder 
should be considered a qualifying diagnosis for an SVP/ADP commitment, they did 
not.”). 
 397. See State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 249 (N.Y. 2014) (“We must interpret 
the Mental Hygiene Law article 10 statute on the assumption that it accords with 
these constitutional requirements.”). 
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These cases indicate that a more individualized approach may be 
appropriate in the civil commitment context. 
In State v. Jerome A., the Supreme Court of New York County 
openly disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ argument that a sole 
diagnosis of ASPD does not distinguish the sex offender from the 
typical recidivist.398  In that case, Respondent Jerome A. contended 
that his diagnosis of “ASPD with psychopathy” was insufficient as a 
mental abnormality under Article 10 and cited Donald DD. for that 
proposition.399  Although the New York Supreme Court ultimately 
dismissed the petition for civil commitment, the Court disagreed with 
Donald DD.’s reasoning that ASPD alone is not a sufficient mental 
abnormality under Article 10.  It reasoned: 
Simply because most prison inmates can be diagnosed with ASPD 
does not mean most prison inmates could also be subject to Article 
10 . . . the vast majority of convicted offenders who have been 
diagnosed with ASPD are not even statutorily eligible for civil 
management.  Of those who are eligible a much smaller fraction 
prior to Donald DD. had become subject to Article 10 and still a 
smaller percentage had been found to have a Mental 
Abnormality.400 
The Court ultimately concluded that “as a factual matter” a sole 
diagnosis of ASPD can “predispose a small minority of offenders with 
that diagnosis to commit sex offenses and result in serious difficulty in 
controlling such conduct.”401 
The Supreme Court of New York County articulated this 
disagreement again in State v. Gary K.402  In that case, the Court 
debunked two arguments frequently cited after Donald DD. was 
decided:  “The Argument That ASPD Is Invalid Because of Its 
Prevalence in the Prison Population” and “The Notion that ASPD 
Plus Some Other Condition Would Be Valid Because an Offender is 
Diagnosed With More Than One Disorder.”403  The Court debunked 
the former argument in stating that “numerical comparisons,” are a 
“poor basis” to decide whether an individual should be subject to civil 
commitment.404  It argued that virtually any disorder, then, could be 
                                                                                                                          
 398. See generally State v. Jerome A., No. 30261-2014, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 
3243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
 399. See id. at *2. 
 400. Id. at *17. 
 401. See id. at *19-20. 
 402. See State v. Gary K., No. 30140/16, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3688, at *23-26 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016). 
 403. See id. at *42-43 (alteration in original). 
 404. Id. 
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looked at on the basis of how it affects the prison population.405  In 
essence, the Court stated that just because a certain percentage of the 
population is diagnosed with the disorder does not mean that 
diagnosis should disqualify any one individual from civil 
commitment.406   
The Court then debunked the latter argument by stating, 
“offenders who have been diagnosed with ASPD alone have 
committed repeated horrific sex crimes.”407  In doing so, the Court 
suggested that the number of diagnoses the individual has should 
have no bearing on whether or not the individual should be civilly 
committed.408  Moreover, the Court implied that ASPD alone may be 
sufficient to civilly confine a sex offender, since offenders with ASPD 
alone have the capacity to commit “repeated horrific sex crimes.” 
3. Permitting ASPD as a Condition Sufficient to Civilly Commit 
Sexual Offenders is Not Contrary to the Purpose of Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws 
Although the sole diagnosis of ASPD “means little more than a 
deep-seated tendency to commit crimes,”409 a person cannot be civilly 
committed under Sexually Violent Predator Laws unless they have a 
history of sexually offending.410  Thus, it is not inconsistent that a 
person who is diagnosed with ASPD and who has a record of 
engaging in “nonconsensual sex without forethought or consideration 
of consequences, and being indifferent to the rights and feelings of 
others in their sexual acts”411 meets the criteria for civil commitment.  
If the fact finder can determine that a person who has committed past 
                                                                                                                          
 405. See id. at *43 (“[I]t would appear that the percentage of the prison population 
who could be diagnosed with some kind of substance or alcohol use disorder might 
equal or exceed the percentage who could be diagnosed with ASPD”). 
 406. See id. (“It is difficult to understand why due-process would preclude lifetime 
confinement for conditions which, for example, 65% of prison inmates had but allow 
it for disorders which 40% of prisoners had.”) 
 407. Id. at *44. 
 408. Id. at *44-45. 
 409. State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 250 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting State v. 
Shannon S., 10 N.Y.3d 99, 110 (N.Y. 2008) (Smith, J., dissenting)). 
 410. Gregory DeClue, Paraphilia NOS (Nonconsenting) and Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 495, 499 (2000) (“No person who meets criteria for 
antisocial personality disorder but has never committed a sexually violent 
act . . . meets criteria for civil commitment as sexually violent predator.”); see also 
Miller, supra note 125, at 2098 (stating that most states define sexually violent 
predator as a person “(1) who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually 
violent offense and (2) who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder 
(3) that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.”). 
 411. See DeClue, supra note 410, at 500. 
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sexual acts is a danger to society, then commitment is consistent with 
the purpose of Sexually Violent Predator Laws.412 
Moreover, as presented in Part II of this Note, other jurisdictions 
have held that ASPD is a condition sufficient in distinguishing the sex 
offender from the typical recidivist.413  These jurisdictions tend to 
recognize the argument that a high percentage of the prison 
population is diagnosed with ASPD414 and that it is not a sexual 
disorder. 415   Nevertheless, these jurisdictions hold that an 
individualized inquiry, or totality of the circumstances approach, is 
the optimal way to determine if the sex offender requires civil 
commitment.416 
B. Balancing Liberty Interests and the Police Powers of the State:  
An Analogy to Fourth Amendment Searches 
Similarly to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution417 works in striking a 
                                                                                                                          
 412. Id. at 499-500 (“[I]n those states that use ‘mental abnormality or personality 
disorder’ to describe the qualifying condition, I see nothing conceptually inconsistent 
with using a diagnosis of [ASPD] as one—or the sole—qualifying disorder.  On a 
case-by-case basis, some people who show a pervasive pattern of violating the rights 
of others, repeatedly performing sexual acts that are grounds for arrest . . . may meet 
the criteria for civil commitment as sexually violent predators.”).  The holdings of 
Frank P. and Donald DD. are enough to make one pause.  Frank P. was convicted 
and imprisoned twice for sexual crimes before he was evaluated to be civilly 
committed. See State v. Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d 483, 152-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).  
Likewise, Donald DD. was imprisoned three times, twice for sexual crimes, before he 
was evaluated to be civilly committed. See Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 244.  Both 
offenders were ineligible for civil commitment because they were only diagnosed 
with ASPD. 
 413. See supra Section II.B. 
 414. See Linehan v. Milczark, 315 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2003); In re Det. of 
Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Iowa 2004). 
 415. In re Miller, 210 P.3d 634 (Kan. 2009). 
 416. See In re Barnes, 689 N.W.2d at 456 (“We think this individualized inquiry 
comports with the requirements of due process because it ultimately serves to limit 
civil commitment to dangerous sexual offenders.  At the same time, it protects those 
persons inflicted with antisocial personality disorder who are not predisposed to 
commit sexual offenses from commitment.”); In re Miller, 210 P.3d at 634 (“[The 
statute] provides for the commitment of a sex offender with any mental 
abnormality . . . that makes him or her more likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual 
violence . . . .”) (emphasis added); Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 107 (Mo. 2007) 
(“[s]imply because ASPD cannot in every case be enough, however, does not make it 
‘too imprecise.’  If ASPD is linked with sexually violent behavior, it can provide the 
basis for commitment.”). 
 417. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
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balance between a constitutional right and the state’s police 
powers.418  In the case of a Fourth Amendment search, the balance is 
between “[i]ndividual liberty and the right to be free from 
government intrusion . . . [and] the government’s ability to ferret out 
criminals and to prevent crime.”419  In the case of the Sexually 
Violent Predator Laws, “the state has the right to write statutes for 
the benefit of society at large, even when providing this benefit may 
come at the cost of restricting the liberties of certain individuals.”420  
Thus, a review of how courts evaluate Fourth Amendment searches 
may provide insight as to how courts should evaluate respondents 
under Sexually Violent Predator Laws. 
The Supreme Court, in Fourth Amendment search cases, has 
adopted a “totality of the circumstances” approach.421  Illinois v. 
Gates was a case specifically about a magistrate’s issuance of a search 
warrant “on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous 
informant’s tip.”422  The Court reasoned that the “totality of the 
circumstance approach” was the optimal way to “achieve the 
accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth 
Amendment requires than . . . [the rigid two-pronged test 
approach]423 . . . that has developed in Aguilar and Spinelli.”424  In 
Gates, the Supreme Court reasoned that this was an area of law that 
needed a more flexible approach to evaluate whether or not an 
unreasonable search had occurred.425 
                                                                                                                          
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
 418. Daniel S. Jonas, Pretext Searches and the Fourth Amendment:  
Unconstitutional Abuses of Power, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1791 (1989) (“Within the 
fourth amendment resides a tension between the privacy rights of individuals and the 
ability of the police power to enforce the law.”). 
 419. Id. 
 420. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31. 
 421. See Kin Kinports, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion:  Totality Tests 
or Rigid Rules?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2014), http://www.pennlaw
review.com/online/163-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-75.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2HW-7DHZ] 
(“Since its decision more than thirty years ago in Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized that the Fourth Amendment’s suspicion requirements—the probable 
cause required to arrest and search, the reasonable suspicion needed to stop and 
frisk—are totality-of-the-circumstances tests.”). 
 422. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 217 (1983). 
 423. Id. at 230 (“We agree [that] . . . an informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and 
‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report.  We 
do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely 
separated and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case . . . .”). 
 424. Id. at 239. 
 425. Id. 
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A more flexible approach is also warranted in the civil commitment 
context.  This scenario is similar to the Fourth Amendment setting:  
the balance must be between a person’s liberty interest and the 
government’s duty to protect the welfare of citizens from dangerous 
recidivistic sex offenders. 426   As mentioned in Sections I.C and 
III.A.1, the Supreme Court specifically warned against a bright-line 
rule in this area of law.427  Moreover, as other jurisdictions have 
noted, the individualized inquiry still serves to eliminate those who 
are not predisposed to sexually offending428 and that just because a 
sex offender convicted of ASPD may require civil commitment in one 
case does not mean a sex offender will require civil commitment in 
another.429  Thus, a totality of the circumstances—or individualized—
approach may be the optimal way to achieve the balance of the public 
and private interests at stake in civil commitment proceedings, just as 
it has been determined to be the optimal way to achieve the balance 
of public and private interests at stake in the Fourth Amendment 
context. 
CONCLUSION 
Antisocial personality disorder should be permitted as a condition 
sufficient to civilly confine a sex offender under Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws.  Sexually Violent Predator Laws were enacted to 
capture those sexually violent offenders that suffer from mental 
abnormalities and continue to pose a danger to society.430  The 
Supreme Court has ruled that in order for these statutes to be 
constitutional, they must apply to those who lack an ability to control 
their sexually violent behavior, distinguishing those individuals from 
the typical criminal recidivist.431  Although ASPD “means little more 
than a deep-seated tendency to commit crimes,”432  the Supreme 
Court cautioned against using bright-line rules in this area of law.433  
Subsequent New York decisions question the bright-line reasoning in 
Donald DD., and other jurisdictions have permitted the use of ASPD 
as a condition sufficient to qualify as a mental abnormality under 
                                                                                                                          
 426. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31. 
 427. See supra Sections I.C, III.A; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). 
 428. See In re Det. of Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Iowa 2004). 
 429. See In re Miller, 210 P.3d 634, 634 (Kan. 2009). 
 430. See supra Section I.C. 
 431. See supra Section I.C. 
 432. State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 250 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting State v. 
Shannon S., 10 N.Y.3d 99, 110 (N.Y. 2008) (Smith, J., dissenting)); see supra Section 
II.A. 
 433. See supra Part III. 
2017] DONALD DD. 917 
Sexually Violent Predator Laws.434  By allowing ASPD to be a 
condition sufficient for civil commitment, an individualized inquiry 
should be used to see whether a particular sex offender is prone to 
reoffend based on his ASPD diagnosis.  In this way, courts will be 
able to thoroughly evaluate which sex offenders require civil 
commitment, without barring an entire class of offenders that have 
the same capability to pose a danger to society just because they are 
diagnosed with ASPD. 
                                                                                                                          
 434. See supra Section III.A.2. 
